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Abstract This paper reviews the recent literature on insensitivity and continuity of
finite horizon optimal plans, in both aggregative as well as multi-sectoral models.
Results on other comparative dynamics questions are also, briefly, discussed.
*This paper has been prepared for a volume in the memory of Sukhamoy Chakravarty,
one of the true pioneers in development planning. I have benefitted from helpful
conversations with Mukul Majumdar, Tapan Mitra and Itzhak Zilcha as well as the
detailed comments of Tapan Mitra on an earlier draft on this paper.
1. Introduction
Much of Sukhamoy Chakravarty's work in the theory of development planning was
directly inspired by his knowledge of the "real" problems that any actual planning exercise
encounters and his deep desire to have theory and application mutually inform each other.
In Chakravarty (1987) he writes of the general philosophy; "Theoretical understanding at a
given point in time, based on the perception of objectives and constraints, led to the
formulation of concrete action schemes or plan directives. In turn, these action schemes,
with some delay, led to the emergence of conjunctures not always anticipated, which in
turn led planners and policy—makers to rethink their objectives and strategies."
An important choice variable for any planning exercise is the length of the plan
horizon (and the associated choice of a final period capital stock). There are well—known
theoretical arguments that suggest that the relevant horizon, especially for national
planning, should be infinite (Pigou (1920), Rawls (1971, pp 271 - 275))1. Chakravarty was
clearly convinced of the theoretical content of this argument (see, for example, the
discussion in his (1969) book and especially pages 19—21). Yet he also believed that, given
the lack of information about technologies and preferences in the distant future as well as
political considerations, "..for applied work on intertemporal planning, a finite horizon
model with terminal capital—stock provision strikes one as the most acceptable
(approach).." (Chakravarty (1967, pl60)). However, any particular choice of horizon is
arbitrary (and indeed there is no logical manner in which to select it optimally without
reverting to the infinite horizon problem). Hence, the question: (when) are optimal choices
and maximized values robust to the actual specification of plan horizon (and terminal
stock)? This was the focus of Chakravarty (1962b, 1966, 1969). Armed with the benefit of
twenty five years of hindsight, that is also the focus of this paper.
There are really two related questions of interest: are finite horizon optimal
investment plans, and the associated level of maximized utility, close to each other for
different specifications of horizon length*! This I will call the insensitivity question. On the
other hand, the continuity question is: is each finite horizon optimum plan close to some
infinite horizon optimum! In turn, the insensitivity and continuity questions are examples
of a broader set of questions in comparative dynamics— the changes in solutions to dynamic
problems on account of changes in underlying parameters of the problem, like preferences
or production relationships. In his (1969) survey, Chakravarty had this to say on the
importance of these questions: "..the outstanding question would seem to be the question of
sensitivity, especially if we are interested in making practical policy recommendations.
Sensitivity...should also cover questions relating to changes in parametric representations
of the utility or production relationships....Hence, we must be careful about distinguishing
between relatively invariant properties of optimal consumption paths and merely
accidental features" (op.cit. p252).
Chakravarty's own work focussed only on the insensitivity question and, although
he was appreciative of the general analytical problem, his discussion was limited to
numerical simulations on some simple computable stationary aggregative examples (indeed
this was also true of contemporaneous studies as those of Maneschi (1966) and Sen
(1961)).2 The literature that I primarily review in this paper has since addressed both
insensitivity and continuity questions, has done so analytically and (in some cases) in
non—stationary and multi—sectoral models. Not surprisingly, some of the early results and
intuitions have had to be modified, or even completely abandoned, but in some other cases
Chakravarty's preliminary results and intuitions have been richly rewarded. I will also
discuss, more briefly, some recent results in comparative dynamics.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I develop the general model.
Section 3 will review the results from the aggregative, or one—sector, model while Section 4
will do likewise for the multi—sectoral model. In Section 5, I collect together some recent
results on comparative dynamics. Throughout, technical details will be kept to a minimum
and the emphasis will be on the intuition underlying the various results; in particular, no
proofs of general theorems will be offered and the reader is invited to directly consult the
relevant references for such proofs.
2. The Intertemporal Allocation Model
Let IR be n-dimensional real space with || • || denoting the max norm on this space
(K , will denote the non—negative orthant). A correspondence, or set—valued mapping, F,
from X c Kn to Y c (Rn is said to be upper semicontinuous (use) at x € X, if F(x) f <|> and for
each sequence x -+ x and an associated sequence y , where y £ F(x ), we have a
convergent subsequence whose limit y 6 F(x). F is use on X if it is use at each x 6 X.
Similarly, F is said to be lower semicontinuous (lsc) at x, if F(x) £ <|> and for each sequence
x -» x and y 6 F(x), there is a sequence y -» y with y e F(x ). Again, F is lsc on X if it
is lsc at all x 6 X. If F is both use and lsc on X, it will be said to be continuous on X.
Production relations in the intertemporal model are specified by (time-indexed)
non-empty production correspondences, (F t) f>n , F • K^ -» R^. F,(x) is the set of feasible
outputs in period t + 1 that is consistent with an input x in period t. Note that in a
multi—sectoral model, the feasible output possibilities are better described by a
correspondence, rather than a (single—valued) production function, since different
combinations of the many commodities may be producible from the same input. Also note
that it is not required that all commodities be essential for production. Finally, we take
the production correspondences to be time—dependent so that (certain kinds of)
technological progress can be accomodated.
A special case of the above framework is the aggregative or one—sector model.
Traditionally, production relations in that model are described by (time—dependent)
production functions ( f . ) . . - , where f,(x) is the maximum output of the single commodity
available in period t + 1, given an investment of x in period t. Given a free disposal
assumption (that I will make in the immediate sequel), a production correspondence can be
derived in the aggregative case by writing F.(x) = {0 < y < ft(x)}. Incidentally,
(inelastically supplied) labor can be straightforwardly incorporated in both the aggregative
as well as multi—sectoral models; indeed, since the production relations (as well as the
utility functions that follow) are time—dependent, some patterns of growth in population
are admissible as well.
The following assumptions on the production correspondences are standard. Each of
the results that follow will employ some subset of these assumptions. Additional, less
standard, assumptions will be introduced and discussed when needed.
(F0) (Null Production) No output is producible from zero inputs; F.(0) = {0}
(Fl) (Continuity) F, is a continuous correspondence for all t
(F2) (Free Disposal) y € Ft(x) =» y'€ Ft(x') if x' > x, 0 < y' < y
(F3) (Convexity) The production possibility set {(x,y) 6 R^n: y € T(x)},
is convex for all t.
(F4) (Boundedness) 3 /? > 0 such that || x || > /? =» || y || < || x ||, for all y e F t(x)
and for all t
The last two assumptions warrant brief comments. The convexity assumption rules
out increasing returns to scale everywhere. Since increasing returns to scale is of central
concern in a growth context, a number of authors have explored the basic questions
without this assumption; consequently, several of the results that follow will not invoke
(F3). The boundedness assumption asserts that strictly positive growth is, eventually,
impossible; that the "marginal product" of capital is less than or equal to one for large
capital stocks. (F0)—(F4) imply that in the aggregative model, the production functions i.
satisfy f,(0) = 0 and are increasing, continuous, concave and have a maximum sustainable
stock.
A finite horizon intertemporal allocation problem, or planning problem, is
characterized by a parameter triple £ = (x, a, T) where x e R^ is the inital capital stock, a
6 K^ is the target stock and T is the plan horizon. Much of the analysis that follows will
involve alternative specifications of the horizon T for fixed (x, a). Writing c, for the
T
consumption in period t, we can define a f-^easible plan or program as (xt>ct)t=_Q
satisfying
xQ + cQ 6 FQ(x) (2.1)
xf + c. EF,(x, A t = 1,...T (2.2)
x^, > a (2.3)
xt > 0, ct > 0 t = 0,...T (2.4)
An infinite horizon feasible planis x,c = (x+Jct)+=n s u c^ *n a t (2-1), (2.2) and (2.4)
are satisfied for all t > 0. Note that I shall refer to the investment (resp. consumption) of
the i—th commodity in period t as xj. (resp. c1,).
The preference structure is defined by a sequence of time—dependent utility
functions (ut)tPM> where uf: K^ -+ K. There are, of course, well known problems with
defining a social welfare function that aggregates individual preferences in a "consistent"
fashion (I refer here to the Arrow impossibility theorem and related results). Since, social
choice issues are peripheral to the immediate concerns of development planning, I shall
follow other writers in assuming that either a social welfare function can be defined or else
that u, is some convex combination of individual utility functions. Utility is defined on
consumption alone. The following assumptions are made on the utility functions:
(Ul) (Continuity) u. is a continuous function, for all t.
(U2) (Monotonicity) cJ > c =mt(c') > ut(c), for all t.
(U3) (Concavity) u, is a strictly concave function, for all t.
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The finite horizon optimization problem is to choose a f—feasible plan
T T T(x
 t (a),c t (a ) ) t = 0 such that
T T
S u t c ^ a ) ) ) S u ( c ) (2.5)
t=0 * l t=0 l l
Tfor all £—feasible (x+>ct)t_(y Note that this optimization problem is trivially equivalent to
1 T
maximizing the average utility, i.e. max S u,(c.) over £—feasible plans.
T + l t=0 l l
Denote the maximized utilities or value functions VT(x) (and v™(x) for the average value).
There are several different ways in which infinite horizon preferences can be
specified and each way of doing so is a response to the problem of defining an order on
infinite utility streams. (A discussion of this problem is incidental to the objectives of this
paper, but it is possibly worth pointing out that the second major capital theoretic
contribution of Chakravarty's was precisely related to this question; see Chakravarty
(1962a)). In this paper I confine attention to, and employ, two of the more popular
alternatives.
Infinite—Sum Utility Functions The obvious extension of finite horizon preferences is to
define infinite horizon utility as
00
U(x,c) = S u t(c t), (x t ,c t) t ,0 (2.6)
t—u
The problem with (2.6) is of course that the infinite sum may not be well—defined,
or finite, for all feasible programs. If it is, then optimality is defined in the usual manner
and we shall denote the associated value function, V(x). The best—known example of
well-defined preferences under this criterion, is that of discounted utilities; ut = tfNi, where
(5 6 [0,1).
Catching—Up Preferences Alternatively, one can define a binary order. We say that
(x*,c*) catches—up to another feasible plan (x,c) if:
Mm E [ u ( c ) - u ( c * ) ] < 0 (2.7)
T-+GD T = 0 l X l l
An optimal program is one that catches up to all other programs. Clearly,
optimality under the first criterion implies optimality under the catching—up.
In the next two sections, I discuss the aggregative and multi—sectoral models
respectively. It will be useful to distinguish between the two since the results, and the
underlying intuition, will turn out to be quite different in the two cases.
3. Sensitivity and Continuity in the Aggregative Model
The one—sector planning model was the exclusive focus of the early literature on
sensitivity analysis. For instance, Chakravarty (1962b) analyzed the following model: the
utility function is time—independent and linearly homogenous, i.e. u.(c) = u(c) = [1—v]~
c V, v 6 [0,1) whereas the (time—independent) production function is linear, i.e. f,(x) =
f(x) = bx where b > 1. This specification of utility and production has the convenient
feature that the optimal solutions can be explicitly computed for different specifications of
the plan horizon and terminal capital stock (as Chakravaty indeed did do, in a continuous
time framework). For the parameter values that he examined, he showed that
consumption in early periods of the plan was more sensitive to the specification of horizon
length and less sensitive to the specification of terminal capital stock. He surmised that
these results would hold qualitatively for more general models. That some caution was
called for in arriving at such a conclusion was suggested by the computations of Manneschi
(1966) who in the same model showed that the result on insensitivity to terminal capital
specifications was overturned for parameter specifications other than those investigated by
Chakravarty.
The inconclusiveness of the debate was largely explained by the fact that the
analyses were based on numerical solutions. Furthermore, this early work strongly hinted
at the need for a general analytical examination of the problem. Brock (1971) was the first
to do so; he examined both the investment sensitivity and continuity issues in a general
convex aggregative model.3
Brock proved two main results relevant to the insensitivity question. The first
established a strong investment monotonicity property for finite horizon optimal plans when
the terminal stock requirement is zero. To be precise, the result showed that if the length
of the plan horizon is increased, say from T to T', but the size of initial capital stock
remains unchanged, then the optimal plan for the T' horizon maintains a higher investment
level than the T horizon optimal plan in every period between 0 and T. An immediate
implication of this property is that consumption is initially lower under the T1—optimal
plan, although it may be eventually higher. This monotonicity property is the critical
intermediate result that implies insensitivity of optimal plans. Brock used it to show that
if the horizons are appropriately long, then the investment (and consequently consumption)
choices in the early periods would be quite similar, i.e. that optimal plans are (initially)
insensitive to horizon specification; for example, the choices in the first three periods are
approximately invariant over horizon T or T', provided both are "long enough". This last
result is of great practical usefulness since a planner may not be sure at the outset of
planning whether the "correct" horizon is T or T\
I present here Brock's results under hypotheses somewhat weaker than those
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employed in his original discussion. These results are due to Mitra (1983). Recall that
T T T
(x, (a),c, (a))t_Q is the notation for an optimal plan from an initial stock x (which
remains fixed throughout and therefore is suppressed in the notation), to a (feasible)
terminal stock a.
Theorem 1 (Brock (1971), Mitra (1983)) Under (FO) - (F3) and (Ul) - (U3), there is a
T T TP
unique optimal plan (x.(a), c t ( a ) ) t _n for every feasible f = (x, a, T). Moreover, these
optimal choices satisfy
i) Horizon monotonicity x ^ + 1 (0 ) > xJ(0)> for all t = 0,...,T.
* rp
ii) Horizon Insensitivity For every t, there is x. = l i m x . (0). Consequently, for all e > 0
1
 T-.a, l
and N, there is T > N such that whenever T > T and T' > T.
||x*(0) - x f (0)|| < e, Hcf(O) - c^'(0)|| < e, t = 0,..,N, (3.1)
iii) Terminal Stock and Horizon Insensitivity There is a terminal stock I > 0, such that for
*• r p
every t, x, = 1 im x, (a), whenever a < a.
l - » 0 D
Two additional comments are worth making. It is of some practical interest to ask
how long the horizons need to be so that the investment and consumption choices are
insensitive in the first three periods; equivalently, how long is T for any given N? For
instance, if the choices in the first three periods are insensitive only when the horizons are
at least three million periods long, such insensitivity would be of very limited practical
significance. Unfortunately, such results on the "rate of convergence" are not currently
available and seem likely to be very model specific. Secondly, the result in Theorem liii)
shows that for a subset of terminal stocks, insensitivity can be established jointly in
horizon and final stock. Clearly, the result states that for any terminal stock less than a,
(3.1) can be established for an appropriate T.
Mathematically inclined readers will no doubt notice that ii) follows quite directly
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from the monotonicity result i). Indeed, the assertion that investment levels are higher
period by period if the horizon is longer, is a very strong assertion. It will be seen shortly
that this is the critical property of the aggregative model which is fragile in that it is
untrue in the multi—sectoral model under otherwise identical hypotheses. The horizon
monotonicity result follows from yet another monotonicity result which says that for
identical horizon length, an optimal plan to a higher capital stock maintains uniformly
T T
higher investment levels, i.e. if aJ > a then x . (a') > x, (a) for t = 0,...,T. The intuition for
this monotonicity result is the following: the convexity of the model implies that marginal
valuations are increasing in terminal stock, i.e. for any xJ, x with, say, x' > x, the
T T
difference in continuation values, V (x';a) — V (x;a), is increasing in a. Since optimal
investment choices balance the marginal utility of immediate consumption (which is
independent of terminal stock) against marginal valuations, it follows that investment
levels are higher if terminal stocks are higher.
What of continuity, i.e. can one assert that the finite horizon optima are themselves
close to any infinite horizon optimum? That this need not be so can be demonstrated quite
easily by way of a well—known "cake—eating" example (which was first employed by Gale
(1967) in a different context).
Example 1 The production and utility functions satisfy (FO) - (F3) and (Ul) - (U3).
However, no finite horizon optimal plan is close to an infinite horizon optimal plan.
Details: Suppose that l ( x ) = f(x) = x and u,(c) = u(c) is any function satisfying
(Ul)—(U3) and further that the terminal stock a = 0.
It can be shown that in this example, the optimal T—horizon consumption policy is
to eat 1/T of the "cake" every period. (This relies on the fact that with a strictly concave
utility a decision—maker strictly prefers to spread consumption over time). Clearly then,
the finite horizon optimal plans involve smaller and smaller amounts of consumption each
12
period as T increases, and in the limit involves zero consumption every period; evidently,
an inoptimal plan under any specification of infinite horizon preferences.^
However, this example does not settle the continuity issue since there is no infinite
horizon optimal plan in this example under, e.g., the catching—up criterion. (The intuition
behind this statement is the same as that driving the claim above). So the next question
is: suppose that the infinite horizon problem does have a solution. Does continuity obtain
in that instance? Brock (1971) (and in his generalization, Mitra (1983)) provided the
following positive answer to the continuity question:4
Theorem 2 Suppose that (FO) - (F3) and (Ul) - (U3) hold and suppose further
that there is a catching—up optimal plan. Then, the plan (x,c) defined as the limit of the
finite horizon optima is precisely this infinite horizon optimum.
An equivalent statement of this result is that if an infinite horizon catching—up
optimal plan exists, then every finite horizon optimal is close to this unique optimum.
Again, the proofs of Brock and Mitra, which are different, both exploit critically the
terminal stock monotonicity result that I have discussed above.
Note that Example 1 has also demonstrated that the insensitivity and continuity
questions are distinct and a positive answer to the former does not imply a likewise positive
answer to the latter. Shortly, we shall see that continuity does not imply insensitivity
either.
Evidently, non—convexities caused on the production side by, for example,
increasing returns to scale and on the consumption side by externalities are particularly
important in a development context. The question I now turn to is: to what extent are the
conclusions of Theorems 1 and 2 valid without the convexity assumptions, (F3) and (U3).
Majumdar and Nermuth (1983), Mitra and Ray (1984) and Amir, Mirman and Perkins
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(1991) have explored this issue; in each case, the authors relaxed production convexity
while retaining consumption convexity. I report here a version of Theorem 1 proved by
Mitraand Ray (1984).
Note that without convexity, albeit only on the production side, there is no longer
uniqueness of optimal choice. A (weak) form of insensitivity is then: for every T—horizon
optimal plan, is there a T'—horizon optimal plan close to it? Mitra and Ray prove just
such a result after proving a (weak) monotonicity version of Theorem 3.1i). The intuition
for the weak monotonicity is identical to that for the stronger version in the fully convex
case of Theorem 3.1i), i.e. that the marginal valuation of capital is increasing in the size of
the target stock (and therefore the length of the horizon).
Theorem 3 (Mitra and Ray (1984)) Suppose (Fl) - (F2) and (Ul) - (U3). Let
£ E (x, a, T) and £' = (x, a, T+l). Then,
T T T
i) Weak Horizon Monotonicity For every f-optimal plan (x. (0), c. (0))._0> there is a
f'-optimal plan (x^+^O), c^ + 1 (O) ) t J J + 1 such that x^O) < x^+1(0), t = 0,..,T.
ii) Weak Horizon Insensitivity There is a feasible infinite horizon plan (x, c), and a
T T1 T
sequence of optimal finite horizon plans, (x. (0), ct(O))._o , T > 0, such that for every t,
rp
x. = 1 im x. (0). Consequently, for all c > 0 and N, there is T > N snch that whenever T
> T and T' > T,
11x^ (0) - x f (0)|| <
 c, ||CT(O) - c f (0)|| < 6, t = 0....N, (3.2)
iii) Terminal Stock and Horizon Insensitivity There is a terminal stock a > 0, snch that for
T —
every t, x. = 1 im x. (a), whenever a < a.
1 - » C D
Majumdar and Nermuth impose the stronger assumption of differentiability on the
production and utility functions. Correspondingly, they establish a stronger result; they
prove Theorem 3i) for all finite horizon optimal plans, i.e. they prove that any £'—optimal
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plan has higher investment levels than any f—optimal plan. Consequently, they are able,
like Brock (1971), to find a unique limiting behavior for finite horizon optimal plans, as the
horizons become longer.
Note that the continuity question, i.e. whether or not an analog of Theorem 2 holds
in the non—convex case, is still open. (It is, however, easy to see that the method of proof
employed by Mitra (1983) on the continuity question implies the following result in the
Mitra—Ray non—convex model: if there is a unique catching—up optimal plan, say (x, c),
then every convergent sequence of finite horizon optimal plans has (x, c) as limit). Also it
is not known which of these results would generalize to the fully non—convex case, i.e. when
both production as well as utility functions can be non—concave. My conjecture would be
that the monotonicity results, and hence the insensitivity results would not be robust to
this generalization.
A brief recapitulation of the results for the aggregative model are in order.
Chakravarty (1962a) had noted that investment and consumption levels in the early years
of a plan were seemingly insensitive to the terminal capital requirement, although
Manneschi then showed that sensitivity was reestablished for other terminal stock
specifications. Chakravarty also conjectured that optimal choices appear to be more
sensitive to the length of the horizon. Subsequent analytical investigations have identified
the set of the terminal stocks on which insensitivity can be asserted and further shown that
horizon insensitivity is more generally true, provided the horizons are appropriately long.
4. Sensitivity and Continuity in the Multi—Sectoral Model
The one—good model of intertemporal allocation is at once a convenient
simplification and also a significant restriction. Its simplicity allows us to test intuitions
and explicitly solve some examples. However, from a practical planning viewpoint, the
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restriction to a single commodity is clearly unacceptable. The central issue is which of the
conclusions of the aggregative model are robust to a multi—sectoral generalization. In this
section I summarize recent results on muti—sectoral sensitivity and continuity. It is worth
pointing out that the literature here is much smaller than that for the aggregative model;
the papers I will refer to are Gale (1967), Radner (1967), Nermuth (1978), Amir (1991) and
Dutta(1991).
From the perspective of sensitivity and continuity analysis, the multi-sectoral
model turns out to be very different from the aggregative one. The principal reason for
this is that the monotonicity results (Theorems li) and 3i)) are invalid in such a model.
(Amir (1991) shows that monotonicity results can be established for the multi—sector
model as well but under much stronger conditions). Since the insensitivity and continuity
properties of the aggregative model were intimately predicated on the monotonicity results,
they fail to generalize as well. We present an example to demonstrate this point.
Example 2 Ft and u. satisfy (FO) - (F3) and (Ul) - (U3) but period 0 investment is
very sensitive to horizon length. In particular, ||xQ — *Q || = lj for all T > 1.
Details: Consider a two—sector model and denote investment (resp. consumption) in
1 2 1 2
period t of the two commodities as x f, x, (resp. c t , c,). Suppose that:
F0(x\x2) = { ( y 1 / ) 6 Of ; y + y < x + X }
Let (mt)t>Q be a strictly increasing sequence, m, > 0, for all t. The preferences are
defined as:
1 2 i
u t(c t, ct) = mt ct, i= 1 if t odd; i=2, if t even (4.2)
uo(cj, eg) E 0
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Finally, let the initial stock x = (1/2,1/2) and the terminal stock a = (0,0). It is
easy to see from (4.1) and (4.2) that (F0) - (F3) and (Ul) - (U3) are satisfied.
1 2
Claim: for T odd, the optimal period 0 investment is given by xQ = 1, xQ = 0 whereas for
T even, xj = 0, x^ = 1.
1 2It is easy to see that, given (4.1) — (4.2), once (xQ, xQ) has been determined, in any
optimal policy the only consumption that takes place is at the terminal and penultimate
1 1 2 2
dates; for instance, when T is odd cT= xQ, C m p x«, and all other consumption is zero.
But a unit of consumption yields greater utility in period T than in T—1. Hence, given the
substitution possibilities in period 0, the claim follows.,
A major role of convexity in the aggregative model (in production and especially in
consumption) was to generate investment monotonicity. Since such monotonicity will not
obtain, and should not be expected, in the multi-sector model even under convexity, the
necessity for such assumptions is moot. In all of the arguments that follow in this section I
will therefore drop the requirement of convexity and by so doing bring the theory arguably
closer to the increasing returns and externality issues that are critical to the development
context.
Note further that Example 2 need not be a cause for despair as far as multi—sectoral
insensitivity is concerned. Asking for investment insensitivity, in the presence of the
substitution possibilities that are opened up by a multi-sectoral specification is asking for
too much in any case. Besides, from a planner's point of view, the relevant question would
appear to be: is the level of maximized utility insensitive to the specification of plan
horizon? A partial intuition for a positive answer to this question is that a substantial
wedge between the values for T and T+l period plans would imply that we would be
strictly better off by choosing one of the two plans in both cases.
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Of course, for this question to be meaningful we have to normalize the sum of
utilities appropriately, for different values of T. The most obvious normalization is to take
averages. Recall that vT(x) is the average utility from initial state x. The value
insensitivity question I now analyze is: under what conditions are v™(x) and Vrp,(x) close,
for long but distinct plan horizons T and T'?5
I present now a positive result on value insensitivity. For this result I need three
new assumptions and one additional piece of notation. For x, x' G Rn, we say that x' > x if
x' > x and x' £ x. Recall the productivity bound p which has been defined by (F4).
(F5) (Uniform Productivity) For all x such that 0 < x < (/?,.../?), there is y(x) €
F,(x) satisfying x < y(x), for all t
(F6) (Limiting Technology) On the compact set {x G Rn: 0 < x < (P,..(3)}> as t -»
CD, the production correspondences F. converge uniformly to a production
correspondence F .
(U4) (Limiting Preferences) On the compact set {c e Kn: 0 < c < (/?,../?)}, the
utility functions u. converge uniformly to a function u , as t -+ m
(F5) is a standard assumption in intertemporal allocation models. The limiting
assumptions, (F6) and (U4) are less standard (but trivially satisfied if the model is
time—independent or discounted—stationary). If the average values are to satisfy some
limiting behavior (as I will report that they do), it must be the case that the environments
of planning (the production and utility relationships) also satisfy some limiting behavior.
Indeed, in Example 3 below, I show that without (F5) and (U4) the value insensitivity
result fails.
Consider any infinite horizon feasible plan (x, c) and define its long-run average
utility as:
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u(x, c) = 1 1 ^ 1 £ ut(cf) (4.3)
" " T-*CD T t = 0 l x
The long-*un average value, for initial state x, is then defined as v(x) = sup u(x,c),
(x,c) feasible from x.
Theorem 4 (Dutta (1991)) Suppose that (FO) - (F2) and (F4) - (F6) hold on the
production side and (Ul), (U2) and (U4) hold on the consumption side. Then, there is v*
such that
i) v* = lim vT(x), 0 < x < (A.. ,$ (4.4)
T-* a) x
ii) v* is the long-run average value, for all 0 < x < (/?,..,/?). In particular,
average values are insensitive to the length of the plan horizon (and initial non—zero stock)
provided the horizon is sufficiently long; V G > 0 and 0 < x, x' < (/?,...,/?), there is T < m
such that | vT(x) - vT ,(x')| < G, whenever min (T, T') > T.
Theorem 4 implies that even if the investment and consumption choices from two
different horizons, T and T', are very different, the associated values per period are very
similar. This has the following useful implication for planning: suppose the planner is
unsure of the exact horizon length but learns about this as time passes and consequently
adjusts his investment levels appropriately. Such an "adaptive planning" framework yields
average utilities that are approximately the same as those that would have been generated
had the planner known the correct horizon with certainty at period zero.
I now present a brief example to show that the limiting assumptions (F6) and (U4)
were necessary for Theorem 4.
Example 3 Technology and preferences satisfy (FO) - (F5), (Ul) - (U3) but
average values are sensitive to the horizon.
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Details: ft = f « = {2? * | $ (4.5)
Let u. be any equicontinuous sequence of functions that are individually continuous
(C00 even), strictly increasing and strictly concave and which satisfy the following property
1 lm L u,( ) > it uJ ) l^ -")
T-»CD T t = 0 2 T-^QD T t = 0 2
Now define
-ut(c) c < 1/2
lu t(l/2) c > 1/2
It is clear that with initial state x = 1 (and hence f(x) = 1), the optimal T—period
plan is x. = c, = 1/2, t = 0, ... T. But then (4.6) implies that average values are sensitive
to the horizon.H
I turn now to the continuity question — is every finite horizon optimal plan (for
some admissible set of terminal stocks) "close" to some infinite horizon optimal plan, for
long but finite horizons? Similarly, is the value, or maximized utilities, continuous at
horizon length infinity? From Example 1 we know that some conditions, in addition to the
basic assumptions (F0) — (F2) and (Ul) — (U2), will need to be placed in order to obtain
affirmative answers to these questions. In the aggregative convex model, recall that it
suffices to know that there exists an optimal plan in the infinite horizon problem. I now
show that in the multi-sectoral model, one needs a somewhat stronger condition; one needs
a condition which guarantees that an optimum exists in the infinite horizon problem.
I present here only one positive result and the reader can consult Dutta (1991) for
other results. The common intuition for these results is the following: think of the finite
and infinite horizon planning problems as special cases of the same family of problems —
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differentiated only by the fact that a relevant parameter, the plan horizon, varies. As the
parameter varies in a continuous fashion, the horizon goes from finite to infinite, under
some restrictions on technology and preferences, the associated optimal choices should vary
continuously as well.
Theorem 5 (Dutta (1991)) Suppose that (Fl) - (F2) and (Ul) - (U2) hold and
o
further that on the set of feasible infinite horizon plans from initial state x, £ u.(c.) is
t=0 l l
finite and upper semi—continuous (with respect to the product topology). Then,
i) (Value Continuity) As T -» m, Vrp(x) -» V(x) the infinite horizon value
function.
ii) (Investment-Consumption Continuity) If the horizon is appropriately long,
each finite horizon optimal plan has an infinite horizon optimal plan close to it, i.e. for all €
> 0 and T < a), there is T such that whenever T1 > T, for any T'—optimal program to
•"Pi ITI»
target stock zero, x (0),c (0) there is an infinite horizon optimal plan (x*, c*) satisfying
| | x t (T ' ) -x t * | |<€ , t = 0,...,T
| |c t(T>)-c t*||<e, t = o,....,T
Remark Nermuth (1978) sought to prove the same theorem under a considerably
stronger condition on infinite horizon preferences but for a larger set of terminal stocks.
Although the theorem is not true under the hypotheses he examined (see Dutta (1991),
Example 4.3), he did however pioneer an analytical approach to the continuity problem
which has proved very useful in general. It should also be noted that an early
value—continuity result is to be found in Radner (1967). In that paper, Theorem 5i) was
shown to hold in a multi—sectoral model with continuity—monotonicity assumptions much
like the ones employed here and the additional assumption that the model is discounted
stationary (F. = F and u = 8 u). (Some additional technical restrictions were also placed).
21
The discounting feature implies that the distant future is (relatively) unimportant and
drives the conclusion of continuity in that paper.
Finally, I present an example to show that even if it is known that there is an
infinite horizon optimum, under the catching—up criterion, it does not follow that finite
horizon optima are close to it even if the finite horizons are "long". (Contrast this with the
Brock result for the aggregative case reported in Theorem 2).
Example 4 There is a unique catching-^up optimal plan (x*, c*) and unique finite horizon
T T
optimal plans (x (0), c (0)). However, no finite horizon optimal plan is close to the
Tinfinite horizonal optimum. In particular, || cn(0) — c«* || = 1, for all T.
Details n= 2. Let x = (1/2, 1/2)
F0(x) = {y1 + y2 < x1 + x2}




 > 2 (4.9)
2 x l x
and Q t_i is an increasing sequence such that Q, > t, Q_. = 1 Finally,
u t ( c \ c2) = c1 + c2 (4.11)
Essentially the two commodities are perfectly substitutable in production in period
zero and thereafter follow totally independent processes. Moreover, for commodity 2's
production to get off the ground, the sum of the commodities has to be used in the second
production process. So the choices are: a) only produce commodity 1 from period 1
onwards (and then the catching—up optimal policy is x. = c, = 1, for all t) or b) switch to
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commodity 2 and the discrete alternatives are x = (1, QQ, Qp ...Q™, 0, 0...) with an
associated c = (0, 0, ...0, Q T , 0). Since Q, > t, the finite horizon optimum is b), for T =
1 2T'. But clearly the unique catching—up optimum is ct, c. = 1, 0, for all t.B
To summarize, I have argued that some of the strong results regarding investment
monotonicity do not carry over from the aggregative to the multi—sectoral models given
the substitution posibilities inherent in the latter. However, value insensitivity and
investment—consumption continuity can still be demonstrated under quite general
conditions on production and preference. It is worth pointing out that that in the
stationary, convex multi—sectoral model, an early result of Gale (1967) elegantly
demonstrated that both insensitivity and continuity did hold. However, his approach
relied very heavily on the underlying convexities.
5. Other Comparative Dynamics Topics
In this section, I will briefly discuss some other comparative dynamics questions
that arise in the theory of intertemporal allocation. A planner is typically unsure about
preferences and technologies in the future. This is particularly so, the further away are the
relevant periods. On the technological side, the lack of information relates to: how much of
technological progress will there be and how fast, what will be the likely menu of
commodities available in the future, what are the prospects for future resource discoveries
etc. On the preference side, a current planner can only approximate actual social
preferences in the future. All of this is self—evident and so is the first theoretical query
that is suggested by it: how robust are the qualitative features of optimal plans to different
specifications of technology and preferences?
The literature on comparative dynamics with respect to production and utility is
limited. Feldman and Mclennan (1990) and Dutta, Majumdar and Sundaram (1991) are
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two recent papers which address aspects of this problem. Both of these papers are set in a
framework much more general than the intertemporal allocation problem that I have
discussed here. Within a very general dynamic programming problem, Dutta, Majumdar
and Sundaram establish conditions under which optimal choices and value functions will
vary continuously with the underlying parameters that index technology and preferences.
Feldman and Mclennan are interested in differentiate changes in optimal choices (under
correspondingly stronger restrictions on the dependence of technology and preferences on
unknown parameters).
One particular aspect of intertemporal preference, whose effect on optimal choices
has been examined in great detail, is the discount factor. In our discussion above, if we
take u, = <Su, for some discount factor 8 6 [0,1) and the horizon T = QD, then we are in the
standard infinite horizon—discounted model. A greater value of the discount factor places a
bigger weight on the utilities of future consumption, and in this sense implies an increase in
"patience". Several authors (Becker (1983, 1985), Dutta (1987), Amir, Mirman and
Perkins (1991)) have explored the following question in the context of the aggregative
model: does an increase in patience imply higher investment out of a given capital stock? I
present a result from Amir, Mirman and Perkins. The result establishes capital deepening
along the optimal discounted plans by exploiting the fact that the marginal continuation
valuations are increasing in the rate of patience, for every fixed level of capital stock.
Theorem 6 (Amir, Mirman and Perkins (1991)) Suppose that (F0) - (F2), (F4) and
(Ul) — (U3) hold and suppose further that fr > 6. Then, for every ^-optimal plan (x.(tf),
ct(a))t=™, there is a ^'^optimal plan (xt(6), ct(Q)t=Q such that x^S) < xt(tf>), t > 0.
A different aspect of the comparative dynamics of discounting is the following
question: under what circumstances can we treat the two cases of discounting and no
discounting (8 = 1) as special instances of the same general problem? In particular, do the
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optimal solutions under discounting converge to optimal solutions under no discounting?
In general, the undiscounted case creates many problems for the definition of infinite
horizon preferences and the establishment of the existence of optima. Dutta (1991a) has
recently shown that under some general conditions like convexity and in the presence of
uncertainty, in many economic models the discounted and undiscounted cases can indeed
be analyzed as special case of the same unified problem.
6. Conclusions
This paper reported some recent results on a research question which Sukhamoy
Chakravarty pioneered and considered to be a theoretical question of central importance
for development planning. For both sensitivity and continuity questions, strong
characterizations are now available in the one—sector model when both preferences and
technologies are convex. A modified version of the insensitivity result also holds when
preferences are convex (although technologies need not be so). In the multi-sectoral,
non-convex model, a framework of particular interest in development planning, the results
are necessarily less striking. However, even here value insensitivity and investment
continuity hold under reasonably general conditions.
Many interesting questions remain to be explored. Clearly, uncertainty,
particularly in production, is an important feature of any planning problem. Majumdar
and Zilcha (1987) have investigated the sensitivity question in the aggregative model with
production uncertainty; an inquiry in the multi—sectoral model remains to be done.
Furthermore, all of the analyses deal with technological progress in virtually an exogenous
manner; the production correspondence and utility functions have arbitrary
time—dependence. However, not all forms of technological growth are feasible or even
desirable. Moreover, such growth is itself determined by the rate and composition of
capital accumulation and hence needs to be substantively endogenous to the model.
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Footnotes
*Pigou and Rawls argued against a finite horizon for social planning problems becuse it
reflects a bias against the consumption of future generations. Indeed, Pigou dismissed
the time preference exhibited by individuals as "habitual myopia" motivated perhaps by
the finiteness of lifetimes. Since, the lifetime of a nation has no logical terminal date
and since the interests of current and future generations should be a priori identical
from a social welfare viewpoint, the Pigou-Ramsey approach advocated an infinite
horizon-zero discount rate framework for planning.
2An exception is Radner (1967). See the discussion in Section 4.
3Although Brock was the first to analytically discuss investment insensitivity, an earlier
discussion of value insensitivity is contained in Radner (1967). Since Radner's
framework accomodates the multi-sectoral model, his result is discussed in detail in
Section 4.
4Actually's Mitra's result only requires that there exist a "weakly maximal" plan; any
catching-up optimal plan is definitionally also weakly maximal. (For a definition of
the weak maximality criterion, see Mitra (1983)).
5An alternative definition of value insensitivity was proposed by Mirrlees and explored
in Hammond and Mirrlees (1973) and Hammond (1975) - see also Mckenzie (1974).
For a fixed infinite horizon plan (x,c) and an initial length of time N, let Vrn(x;N)
denote the maximum utility that can be generated in a T-period planning problem,
starting from initial stock x, if in the first N periods investment (and consumption) has
to be identical to that specified by (x,c). The finite horizon optimum plans are said
to be value-insensitive, agreeable in the terminology of these papers, if there is a plan
(x,c) and a sufficiently long horizon T such that Vrp(x;N) and Vrp,(x;N) are
appropriately close to each other whenever T and T' are greater than T (and this is
true for all N). This concept of value insensitivity is interesting; however, the
literature was largely inconclusive in that the authors were able to derive results on
questions like the existence of agreeable plans, their relation to optimality etc, only in
very special cases. This literature is not detailed in this survey..
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